The Strategic Importance of Monitoring and Transparency in Iran’s Nuclear Program for the United States

30 Apr 2025

نویسنده: محمد کاظمی

Introduction

In nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States, the exchange of concessions has consistently been a focal point. As talks progress, the lifting of sanctions in return for Iran’s nuclear concessions is likely to dominate discussions. Understanding which nuclear concessions carry the greatest weight for the U.S. is critical to crafting an effective negotiating strategy for Iran. Overlooking this could squander valuable opportunities or lead to conceding key assets without securing adequate reciprocity. Analysis of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), expert commentary, and policy recommendations from U.S. nuclear authorities reveals that “monitoring and transparency,” “unfettered access” to Iran’s nuclear program, and “intrusive monitoring” are the United States’ top priorities.

Types of Nuclear Concessions

During the negotiations, Iran might be expected to undertake a wide range of activities and commitments. These concessions can be categorized as follows:

Enrichment

Locations and facilities.
Enrichment levels (uranium purity percentage).
Stockpiles of enriched material.

Centrifuges

Number of active and idle centrifuges.
Type and generation of centrifuges.

Research and Development

Scope and extent of nuclear technology research.

Heavy Water Reactor

Status and operations of heavy water reactors, such as the Arak facility.

Fuel Reprocessing

Commitments regarding the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel.

Monitoring and Confidence-Building

Implementation of the Additional Protocol and Modified Code 3.1.
Adherence to the IAEA’s “Roadmap for Clarification.”
Voluntary measures outlined in the JCPOA, including:

- Long-term IAEA presence in Iran.
- Oversight of uranium ore concentrate plants.
- Containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows
- On-line enrichment measurement (OLEM) and electronic seals.
- Provision of rapid, unannounced IAEA access to nuclear facilities.

U.S. Prioritization of Monitoring and Transparency

Among the various nuclear concessions Iran might be asked, “monitoring and transparency” stands out as the United States’ foremost priority. This assertion is supported by multiple lines of evidence. First, the JCPOA text devotes significant attention to extensive monitoring obligations for Iran, including adherence to the Additional Protocol, comprehensive IAEA inspections, and the use of advanced monitoring tools like OLEMs. These commitments, detailed in the JCPOA’s “Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures” section and Annex I (Nuclear-Related Measures), underscore the West’s intense focus on this area.

Analyses from prominent U.S. think tanks and statements by American officials further reinforce this priority. Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, emphasizes in her March 2025 report, The Art of a New Nuclear Deal with Iran in 2025, that an effective agreement must include robust and verifiable monitoring to mitigate risks posed by Iran’s nuclear advancements, particularly its growing enrichment capacity and 60% enriched uranium stockpiles. “The United States should aim to maximize monitoring and transparency in a new nuclear agreement with Iran. Ideally, an agreement will give inspectors access to all facilities in Iran that are part of or support the country’s nuclear program and allow the IAEA to use additional tools to ensure rapid detection of any attempts to divert materials for a covert program or deviate from declared activities”, writes Kelsey Davenport.[1]

Similarly, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), in a February 2025 memo by Andrea Stricker titled Detecting and Halting an Iranian Weaponization Effort, stresses the need for strict IAEA inspections to Iran’s nuclear facilities, arguing that without it, Iran could rapidly pursue nuclear weapons.[2]

Recent statements from U.S. officials corroborate this focus. In April 2025, Steven Witkoff, Special Presidential Envoy for the Middle East, stated that any diplomatic agreement with Iran hinges on “full transparency and verifiable details” of its nuclear program. Mike Waltz, National Security Advisor, emphasized in March 2025 that Iran must fully and verifiably abandon all aspects of its nuclear program, including enrichment and weaponization activities, which requires “comprehensive and ongoing monitoring.” President Donald Trump, in February 2025 remarks, reiterated his “maximum pressure” policy, asserting that any deal must include “complete IAEA access to Iran’s facilities” to prevent nuclear weapon development. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, in April 2025, underscored the urgency of “swift and extensive access” to Iran’s facilities to counter its rapid enrichment to 60% purity, warning of potential dangerous advancements.

Collectively, these sources—from the JCPOA text to influential think tank reports and high-level U.S. and IAEA statements—demonstrate that monitoring and transparency are paramount in U.S. demands during nuclear negotiations.

Reasons for U.S. Emphasis on Monitoring and Transparency

The U.S. focus on monitoring and transparency stems from deep strategic and operational considerations. Beyond serving as a technical verification tool, monitoring provides comprehensive, real-time insights into Iran’s nuclear activities, offering the U.S. multiple strategic advantages. The key reasons for this emphasis include:

Strategic Advantage in Agreement Design

Detailed monitoring data enables the U.S. to maintain a strategic edge in crafting agreements. This information establishes a “baseline” for designing verifiable safeguards. For instance, data from JCPOA inspections and monitoring tools, such as online enrichment monitors, allows the U.S. to set precise limits on centrifuge numbers, enrichment levels, and stockpiled materials with full knowledge of Iran’s nuclear status. This insight ensures the U.S. retains control over the agreement’s framework and specifics.

Shaping Iran’s Nuclear Trajectory

Continuous monitoring and access to Iran’s nuclear facilities and developments allow the U.S. and its allies to track Iran’s nuclear progress – including the production of centrifuge rotors and bellows or uranium concentrate facilities, enabling the West to curb or slow Iran’s development of sensitive capabilities. The Institute for Science and International Security’s November 2022 report notes that precise monitoring of Iran’s nuclear supply chain has constrained its enrichment program expansion.

Enabling Military or Sabotage Operations

Monitoring provides precise data on facility locations, layouts, equipment specifications, and operational schedules, enhancing the U.S. and its allies’ ability to plan military or sabotage operations. For example, data from IAEA inspections or electronic monitoring could inform targeted cyberattacks (e.g., Stuxnet) or precision military strikes. The FDD’s February 2025 report explicitly states that robust monitoring supplies the intelligence needed for “preemptive actions,” including military options, to detect and disrupt Iran’s nuclear activities.

Preventing Unforeseen Advancements

Extensive monitoring reassures the U.S. that Iran cannot covertly or suddenly pursue nuclear weapons. This is particularly critical given Iran’s recent progress in enriching uranium to 60% and expanding its nuclear material stockpiles. Kelsey Davenport’s March 2025 Arms Control Association report warns that without robust monitoring, the risk of Iran’s “nuclear breakout” increases significantly, as the time required to produce fissile material has drastically shortened.

Bolstering Diplomatic and Political Leverage

Monitoring data equips the U.S. to swiftly present evidence of Iran’s non-compliance, rallying international support for diplomatic pressure or new sanctions. For instance, IAEA reports from 2022 and 2023, based on monitoring data, enabled the U.S. and its allies to push resolutions condemning Iran at the IAEA Board of Governors.

These factors illustrate that monitoring is not merely a verification mechanism but a powerful tool for the U.S., influencing everything from agreement design to constraining Iran’s capabilities and preparing for military scenarios.

Iran’s Strategic Considerations in Negotiations

Given the critical importance of monitoring and transparency to the U.S. and its allies, Iran must approach nuclear negotiations with precision and foresight to maximize its national interests. This raises several key considerations for Iran’s negotiating team:

Minimizing Extensive Monitoring Commitments

Since monitoring is vital to the West and serves as a long-term tool to constrain Iran’s nuclear capabilities, Iran should avoid agreeing to expansive and maximalist monitoring obligations, such as unlimited intrusive inspections or the permanent presence of IAEA inspectors, in any potential deal. This preserves Iran’s nuclear autonomy and safeguards sensitive information that could be used to design agreements or preemptive actions against it.

Securing Major Concessions for Monitoring Agreements

If Iran must accept monitoring commitments, it should demand significant and proportional concessions in return, given monitoring’s strategic weight for the West. These could include the complete and permanent lifting of sanctions, guaranteed access to global markets, or substantial investments in Iran’s civilian infrastructure. However, such concessions from the U.S. are unlikely. Any agreement that accepts extensive monitoring without equivalent reciprocity would undermine Iran’s national interests.

Recognizing the Irreversibility of Monitoring Data

A critical aspect of monitoring concessions is their irreversibility. Once sensitive details about Iran’s facilities, equipment, or supply chains are shared with the IAEA or Western counterparts, they cannot be retrieved and could be exploited against Iran for years. Therefore, any concessions Iran requests in exchange for monitoring must be equally irreversible.

Proposing Safeguards to Mitigate Monitoring Risks

To limit the fallout from extensive monitoring, Iran should advocate for protective mechanisms, such as restricting inspections to declared facilities, setting time limits on inspector presence, or preventing access to non-nuclear-related data. These measures would reduce the risk of unnecessary disclosures and potential misuse of monitoring data.

[1] The Art of a New Iranian Nuclear Deal in 2025, March 19, 2025