Introduction
On July 24, 2025, The Jerusalem Post published an article titled: “Taiwan stood with Israel now it’s our turn”: more than 70 Israeli lawmakers declared their support for Taiwan[1].
The report, written at the initiative of Boaz Toporovsky (a senior member of Yesh Atid and head of the Israel–Taiwan parliamentary friendship group) and Tad Ohal (a member of the Religious Zionist party), states that 72 members of the Knesset signed a statement condemning Taiwan’s exclusion from international bodies and calling for its participation in organizations such as the WHO and ICAO. This move was presented as a gesture of appreciation for Taiwan’s support for the Zionist regime, especially following the Operation Al-Aqsa Storm. Taiwan’s representative described the support as historic and a symbol of solidarity among democracies.
This comes at a time when Taiwan sits at the core of China’s interests, and the Zionist regime is increasingly moving away from China, particularly after October 7, 2023.
China’s reaction
China had, for some time, sought to improve its image in Israel. Beijing’s latest step in that direction was a press conference held by its ambassador to the Occupied Territories after the 12-day war, concerning China’s role in the 12-day war and issues such as the security of Chinese electric vehicles (from the perspective of sensitive data being transmitted to Beijing via those vehicles)[2]. At that meeting the Chinese ambassador rejected all accusations that China had sent weapons to Iran or engaged in defensive cooperation with the Islamic Republic, and he called the allegations against Chinese electric vehicles lies. However, after that statement the spokesperson of China’s embassy in the regime, in an interview with the press on the same date, reacted to the statement and answered reporters with a hard-hitting speech in which he said, in part: “We cannot help but ask: What kind of influence have these individual Israeli legislators been under? What hidden motives do they have? The Yesh Atid party Boaz Toporovsky and the Religious Zionism party leader Ohad Tal, who took the lead in drafting this statement, respectively visited Taiwan this year, meeting with the so-called “Vice President” and “Foreign Minister” of Taiwan. After returning, they began openly referring to Taiwan as a “country” on social media in their sycophantic exchanges with their Taiwanese counterparts. In their official statement, they claim that Israel adheres to the One-China policy, but in reality, but their actions contradict this policy—this is sheer self-deception. What exactly are they trying to hide from the Israeli public? And what lies did they use to deceive other legislators into co-signing this statement?”[3]
Of course, this is not the first time Knesset members have visited Taiwan. The first occasion was in 2006, when five Knesset members traveled to Taiwan, and at that time the then-Chinese ambassador also reacted strongly to the visit. But many things between China and the Zionist regime have changed since then.[4]
What happened?
One of the most important factors shaping the chill between China and the Zionist regime was Operation Al-Aqsa Storm. At that time Beijing refrained from condemning Palestinian resistance and again reiterated the issue of establishing a Palestinian state. China’s diplomatic support for Iran in international forums has also fueled Tel Aviv’s dissatisfaction with Beijing. for example, after Iran’s attack on Israel in response to Israel’s strike on the Islamic Republic’s consulate in Damascus on April 14, 2024, China’s ambassador to the United Nations justified that attack and stated that Iran’s military action was a response to Israeli aggression.
The closure of the Israel branch of China’s University of International Business and Economics in the city of Petah Tikva after four years of operation, reportedly due to the Chinese government’s positions against Israel during the Gaza war and the institution’s unwillingness to continue operating in Israel, together with the sharp decline in China’s popularity in Israel (which the Institute for National Security Studies, INSS, says fell from 66% in 2019 to 16% in 2024) illustrate the poor state of relations between China and the Zionist regime[5].
There are also multiple reports indicating a decrease in Chinese investment in Israel due to U.S. pressure. The Economist, in a 2021 report, quoted an Israeli official saying that the Americans made it clear to Israel that they would not accept any Chinese involvement in critical infrastructure[6].
Naturally, China will also lose interest in economic partnership with Israel, because the issues raised suggest that Israel cannot be relied upon as a trustworthy partner and a positive future is hard to envision, when Israel is so heavily influenced by U.S. policy, China’s interests will not be secured.
What will happen?
It seems the rift between China and Israel, which had already grown before Operation Al-Aqsa Storm due to U.S. pressure and restrictions on Israel’s exports of sensitive technologies to China is no longer easily resolvable. Some analysts argue that China’s response to this move which, arguably, was delayed because the two aforementioned representatives’ trip to Taiwan occurred in April could take multiple forms and pursue different objectives; for example, it could be used to justify increased cooperation with Iran in various fields.
At the same time, Israel’s growing closeness to India and the regime’s support for the IMEC initiative, a rival to China’s Belt and Road Initiative that links India to Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and ultimately Israel, indicate that the gap between China and the Zionist regime has widened further.
Given these developments, the idea that China might exclude Israel from its strategic frameworks is no longer far-fetched.
Conclusion
Recent developments in China–Israel relations should not be dismissed as merely a string of temporary disputes or emotional diplomatic reactions; what is unfolding is a redefinition of each side’s place in the other’s calculations. China is gradually moving beyond the traditional view of Israel as simply an economic and technological partner, and is increasingly assessing it within the framework of geopolitical competition with the West, particularly the United States. Conversely, Israel no longer regards China as a long-term investor or a neutral mediator in regional conflicts; instead it places China alongside its strategic adversaries, from Iran to the Palestinian issue.
Behind these shifts lies a much deeper transformation: China–Israel relations have entered a stage of strategic divergence. This divergence, together with Israel’s growing closeness to India, its alignment with initiatives such as IMEC (which directly competes with China’s Belt and Road Initiative), and its adherence to Washington’s demands to curb Chinese influence in technology and infrastructure, clearly indicate that the “golden days” of the Beijing–Tel Aviv relationship are over.
Accordingly, the answer to the question “Are fundamental changes on the way?” is clearer than ever: fundamental changes are not only on the way, they have already begun; it’s just that the sound of this rupture may not yet be audible above the clamor of global competition.
[1]Jerusalem Post reports that 70 Knesset members support Taiwan
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-862102
[2] Report by the Israeli website JNS from the press conference of the Chinese ambassador to Israel
https://www.jns.org/a-lie-repeated-1000-times-is-still-a-lie-chinas-israel-envoy-hits-back /
[3] Report from the Chinese Embassy in the regime regarding this press conference
https://thechinaacademy.org/china-warns-israel-of-serious-consequences-over-taiwan-related-actions /
[4] Archive of the Israeli Ynet website in 2006 and news about the trip of 5 Knesset representatives to Taiwan
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3303226,00.html
[5] INSS report on China’s popularity in the Zionist regime
https://www.inss.org.il/publication/china-rhetoric/
[6] The Economist magazine report on trade between China and the Zionist regime
